

Executive Summary

Congress directed, in the 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, that the CPRC be established to review activities and programs related to countering proliferation within the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This high level national commitment to counter proliferation threats is reflected in the CPRC's membership. It is chaired by the Secretary of Defense, and composed of the Secretary of Energy (as Vice Chairman), the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CPRC is chartered to make recommendations relative to modifications in programs required to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The CPRC is also tasked to assess progress toward implementing its previous recommendations and the recommendations of its predecessor, the Nonproliferation Program Review Committee (NPRC). This report presents the findings and recommendations of the CPRC's annual review for 1996.

The recommendations of the 1994 NPRC report constitute an integrated, top level plan to improve the overall capability of the United States in countering WMD proliferation threats. The CPRC reviewed the progress in meeting the goals and objectives of this plan last year and recommended additional initiatives to improve the interdepartmental response to countering WMD proliferation threats. These recommendations included establishing a prioritized list of counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements (ACEs). The ACEs define those priority areas where additional capabilities are required to meet the challenges posed by WMD proliferation threats. They prioritize the counterproliferation-related responses to interdepartmental policy needs and, in particular, reflect the operational requirements of the Unified Commands for countering proliferation. In fact, the counterproliferation ACEs combine the CPRC-endorsed NPRC "Areas for Progress" and the counterproliferation warfighting priorities of the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified Commands. The ACEs, listed in Table 1, serve to guide the CPRC's program review process and are used as the basis to assess progress in meeting the counterproliferation and related nonproliferation mission needs of the CPRC-represented Departments.

Because several new initiatives have been undertaken since the CPRC/NPRC review process began, the time is right to evaluate the progress that has been made in enhancing the ability of the U.S. to respond to and counter WMD proliferation threats. Accordingly, the CPRC focused its review activities this year on examining key accomplishments in each ACE priority area. Although it will take several years to implement the full set of CPRC/NPRC recommendations, the CPRC can report that progress has been made over the past two years in many ACE priority areas. This progress has led to a strengthening of U.S. capabilities for countering proliferation. This strengthening includes the rapid fielding of essential capabilities, focused interdepartmental R&D activities, and improved integration, management, and oversight of programs related to countering proliferation.

Table 1: CPRC Counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements

Counterproliferation ACEs (in priority order)
1.) Detection, Identification, and Characterization of BW/CW Agents
2.) Cruise Missile Defense
3.) Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
4.) Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of Underground WMD Facilities
5.) Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Actionable Intelligence to the Warfighter
6.) Robust Passive Defense to Enable Continued Operations on the NBC Battlefield
7.) BW Vaccine RDT&E and Production to Ensure Availability
8.) Target Planning for WMD Targets
9.) BW/CW Agent Defeat
10.) Detection and Tracking of WMD and WMD-Related Shipments
11.) Prompt Mobile Target Detection and Defeat
12.) Support for Special Operations Forces
13.) Defend Against Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist WMD Threats
14.) Support Export Control Activities of the U.S. Government
15.) Support Inspection and Monitoring Activities of Verifiable Arms Control Agreements and Regimes

Commensurate with the seriousness of the threat, DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence have each made serious commitments to enhance national capabilities to counter the proliferation of WMD. DoD investments in areas strongly related to counterproliferation total just under \$4.3 billion for FY 1997, of which approximately \$2.9 billion is for missile defense. This investment compares favorably with last year's investment of \$3.8 billion, reflecting DoD's steady commitment in the face of increasing budget pressures. It must be emphasized that this investment leverages the substantial investments made in maintaining the requisite military forces and defense infrastructure necessary to provide for the common defense of the United States. DoD budgets the bulk of its counterproliferation investment in theater and national missile defense (ACE priorities 2 and 3); detection and characterization of chemical and biological warfare (CW/BW) agents (ACE priority 1); maintaining a robust nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) passive defense capability (ACE priority 6); prompt mobile target detection and defeat (ACE priority 11); and supporting inspection and monitoring activities of verifiable arms control agreements (ACE priority 15).

DOE has increased its investments in nonproliferation activities for FY 1997 to \$411.5 million, up 5.5% over last year. DOE focuses its efforts on supporting the inspection and monitoring of arms control agreements (ACE priority 15), defending against covert delivery and terrorist threats (ACE priority 13), and the tracking and control of nuclear materials (ACE priorities 10 and 14), in addition to supporting core national nonproliferation activities. U.S. Intelligence's

investments in programs to counter proliferation are discussed in an “Intelligence Annex” to this report (bound separately).

Since the May 1995 CPRC report was submitted, the following initiatives have been undertaken and accomplishments achieved by DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence to enhance the interdepartmental response to countering WMD proliferation threats.

DoD Accomplishments

- ***DoD’s Counterproliferation Initiative and the Counterproliferation Support Program.*** The Counterproliferation Initiative is DoD’s Department-wide effort to meet the military challenges posed by the proliferation of WMD, including the preparations necessary to conduct successful military operations in an NBC environment. At the heart of the Initiative is the Counterproliferation Support Program established specifically to address DoD shortfalls in counterproliferation capabilities. This program, managed by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)), uses its budget to leverage DoD acquisition programs to meet the counterproliferation priorities of the CINCs and accelerate the deployment of enhanced capabilities to the field. Currently, the Counterproliferation Support Program is targeting 8 of the 15 ACEs where leveraged support can be decisive. The Counterproliferation Support Program also conducts technology development activities at the DOE National Laboratories on a Work for Others basis under a joint DoD/DOE Memorandum of Understanding.
- ***DoD Counterproliferation Implementation Directive.*** A DoD Directive has been developed to codify the progress made to date in implementing the Counterproliferation Initiative and to guide the Department’s future work. The Directive identifies specific responsibilities, formalizes relationships among DoD organizations, and establishes common terms of reference.
- ***Establishment of the Counterproliferation Council.*** To ensure that DoD’s implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative is integrated and focused, DoD has established a Counterproliferation Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and composed of senior DoD and Joint Staff officials, to review Departmental progress in meeting counterproliferation objectives.
- ***CINC Counterproliferation and Planning Activities.*** In May 1995 the Secretary of Defense approved the CJCS’s *Missions and Functions Study*. It concluded that each geographic CINC should be responsible for executing U.S. counterproliferation policy within his area of responsibility, and that its implementation would be executed via each CINC’s standard deliberate planning process. Based on this study, the Secretary of Defense directed that a *Counterproliferation Charter* be developed to supplement top-level policy guidance and provide a military focus with respect to the counterproliferation mission. The CJCS subsequently issued a *Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN* which further defines national level counterproliferation policy in terms of operational objectives and tasks that will assist the CINCs in developing their area-specific plans.
- ***Ongoing Review of Joint NBC Defense and Counterproliferation Programs.*** The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a joint review of all DoD counterproliferation-related programs to assess programmatic alternatives and priorities, policy impacts, CINC requirements, and

management alternatives. The goal of this study, which is scheduled to be completed by 30 June 1996, is to define a restructured acquisition program that meets the CINCs' counterproliferation mission needs. The results of this study will be incorporated during the FY 1998 - 2003 program budget review process.

- ***DoD's Biological Defense BW Vaccine Acquisition Program.*** The need to produce vaccines at a pace rapid enough to match any anticipated battlefield demand is a high CPKC and CINC priority. Significant progress has been made in developing a BW vaccine production program, and a solid acquisition strategy, based on comprehensive analyses, is in place. A Request for Proposals will be released to industry this fiscal year to select a prime systems contractor, and contract award is anticipated for the first quarter of FY 1997.
- ***New DoD Initiatives to Counter Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist WMD Threats.*** The ATSD(NCB) recently signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and a similar agreement is being formalized between the Counterproliferation Support Program and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. These agreements will facilitate closer cooperation among the organizations and improve DoD's acquisition response in meeting the requirements of CINC SOCOM, DoD, and interagency organizations to counter threats from WMD-armed terrorists and covert and paramilitary forces. These agreements focus on accelerating and adapting technologies in BW/CW defense for use by special operations forces and other units to address critical technology shortfalls.
- ***The Hard and/or Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability Integrated Product Team.*** The concept exploration phase of this Joint Service DoD acquisition effort has been established to demonstrate concepts for the defeat of hard and/or deeply buried targets — a key ACE priority. The concept collection process is underway, and concept proposals from industry will be formally received in May. The effort is coordinated through an Integrated Product Team.
- ***Science and Technology Strategic Planning for Counterproliferation.*** The strategic planning process for DoD's science and technology (S&T) program was enhanced this year with the issuance of the *Joint Warfighting S&T Plan*. BW/CW detection and counterproliferation are two of the 12 Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives identified in the plan. The *Joint Warfighting S&T Plan* will be issued annually as Defense Guidance, and its Joint Warfare Capability Objectives will receive funding priority in DoD's Future Years Defense Program.
- ***Reorganization of the Militarily Critical Technologies List.*** Starting this year, *The Militarily Critical Technologies List*, the primary source document identifying leading edge military and dual-use technologies for proliferation control, is being divided into three parts, each focusing on a critical technology area. Part 2, entitled *Weapons of Mass Destruction*, will provide a detailed listing, with detailed technical performance parameters, of those technologies required for the production of WMD and their means of delivery. Parts 1 and 3 are entitled *Weapons Systems Technology* and *Critical Emerging Technologies*, respectively.
- ***Establishment of a DoD Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs.*** To prepare for the future implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a new Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs has been established reporting to the ATSD(NCB). The broad mission of this position is to oversee DoD activities related to the implementation and compliance verification of the CTBT.

- ***Restructuring of Passive Defense Program Oversight.*** Starting in FY 1997, Counterproliferation Support Program projects leveraging Chemical and Biological Defense Program projects in NBC individual and collective protection and BW/CW point detection will be transferred to the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, which oversees and coordinates all DoD programs in passive defense. Chemical and Biological Defense Program projects in long range standoff BW detection will be transferred to the Counterproliferation Support Program. This restructuring will improve and streamline management oversight responsibilities.
- ***Key Programmatic Accomplishments.*** Well over 100 DoD programs are strongly supporting national efforts to counter WMD proliferation threats. Over the past two years, substantial progress has been made by these programs to improve fielded counterproliferation and nonproliferation capabilities and to establish the necessary groundwork for continuing advances. A few, selected programmatic accomplishments are summarized in Table 2 below. A more detailed description of the programmatic accomplishments may be found in the main body of the report and in the Intelligence Annex.

DOE Accomplishments

- ***Detecting and Characterizing Worldwide Production of Nuclear Materials and Weapons.*** Under its production detection program, DOE is developing a set of both remote and on-site complementary tools to detect and characterize foreign nuclear materials production activities. This capability serves as a powerful deterrent to proliferation.
- ***Monitoring Worldwide Nuclear Testing.*** DOE experience in developing and deploying, in conjunction with DoD, systems to monitor the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty has been refocused recently on verifying and monitoring the CTBT. DOE is developing and delivering elements of a U.S. National Technical Means as well as international monitoring systems for this purpose.
- ***Securing Nuclear Materials in Russia and the Newly Independent States.*** DOE has been very successful in coordinating technical expert interactions at the government-to-government and the

Table 2: DoD's Programmatic Response to the Counterproliferation ACEs

Counterproliferation ACE	Selected Accomplishments in DoD Counterproliferation Programs
1. Detection, Identification, and Characterization of BW/CW Agents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deployed the Biological Integrated Detection System and activated a contingency BIDS platoon, providing U.S. forces with a fielded BW detection capability • Continued deployment of critical CW agent detection systems • Accelerated development of remote BW agent detection systems
2. Cruise Missile Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provided radar hardware for the "Mountain Top" cruise missile defense demonstration • Technology sharing and synergy with ballistic missile defense programs
3. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Completed 5 Theater High Altitude Area Defense system flight tests • Completed initial flight demonstrations of Navy Theater-Wide System • Conducted initial lethality testing of Navy Area Defense System • Demonstrated enhanced laser power for Airborne Laser boost phase intercept system and prepared for demonstration and validation • Completed Statement of Intent with European partners for the Medium Extended Air Defense System • Shifted National Missile Defense from technology readiness to 3 year deployment readiness • Flight qualified 23 sensor and detector technologies for ballistic and cruise missile defense
4. Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of Underground WMD Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducted field tests of underground WMD facility defeat and collateral effects mitigation in support of the Counterproliferation ACTD
5. Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Actionable Intelligence to the Warfighter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See Intelligence Annex
6. Robust Passive Defense to Enable Continued Operations on the NBC Battlefield	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued deployment of critical NBC battlefield detection and warning systems and individual and collective protection systems • Considerable advances in BW/CW medical defense R&D
7. BW Vaccine RDT&E and Production to Ensure Availability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decided on a prime systems contractor acquisition approach to BW vaccine production and released a draft Request for Proposals for industry comment • Began production of anthrax vaccine to meet DoD stockpile needs and screened several BW vaccines for safety and efficacy
8. Target Planning for WMD Targets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deployed prototype integrated target planning tools to CINC USEUCOM for use in Bosnia as part of Operation Joint Endeavor
9. BW/CW Agent Defeat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducted initial phenomenology tests as part of the Counterproliferation ACTD (Phase I)
10. Detection and Tracking of WMD and WMD-Related Shipments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiated deployment of prototype Specific Emitter Identification System for tracking ships at sea
11. Prompt Mobile Target Detection and Defeat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducted tests of advanced radars and other sensors for mobile target detection • Demonstrated functionality of C4I systems for rapid dissemination of intelligence to users
12. Support for Special Operations Forces (SOF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued development of specialized equipment and prototypes for rapid fielding • Conducted joint training exercises dealing with counter-WMD-related missions • Establishing the USMC Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force
13. Defend Against Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist WMD Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accelerated development of technologies, prototype systems, and specialized equipment to assist SOF and Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams in countering BW/CW threats • Enhanced coordination of Joint Service exercises and readiness sustainment activities
14. Support Export Control Activities of the U.S. Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revised U.S. Export Administration Regulations and reviewed over 10,000 export license application for military and dual-use technologies
15. Support Inspection and Monitoring Activities of Verifiable Arms Control Agreements and Regimes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supported removal and return of all nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan to Russia • Secured withdrawal of 63 of 81 SS-25 mobile ICBMs and launchers from Belarus to Russia • Deactivated all SS-24 and half of the SS-19 ICBMs in Ukraine • Established 17 joint business ventures between U.S. companies and FSU defense enterprises • Transitioned over 11,500 FSU scientists and engineers formerly employed in WMD production to more peaceful civilian employment • Continued inspection, monitoring, and escort support for nuclear and chemical weapons arms control treaties • Continued development of a global continuous threshold monitoring network and data fusion knowledge base for CTBT verification

laboratory-to-laboratory levels between U.S. and former Soviet Union (FSU) states to implement upgraded fissile material security procedures and technologies. Under the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC&A), DOE is working to install modern safeguards equipment and provide technical training at over 35 facilities throughout the Russian Federation and the Newly Independent States (NIS). In June 1995, DOE entered into a cooperative agreement with the Russian Federal Nuclear Radiation and Safety Authority to implement a Russian state system for MPC&A. Starting with one site involving 75 kilograms of highly enriched uranium in 1994, the program achieved MPC&A upgrades for over eight tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium at 26 facilities in 1995, and in 1996 hundreds of tons of nuclear material at over 40 facilities will be involved. This intense activity is expected to continue in FY 1997 at the 17 facilities added during the last six months, and as additional locations are negotiated for inclusion.

- ***The Industrial Partnering Program with Russia/NIS.*** Under this program DOE national laboratories work with Russian and NIS institutes to identify and evaluate the commercial potential of indigenous R&D capabilities. Partnerships, preferably through cost-sharing relationships with U.S. industry, are then facilitated to develop specific commercial products. To date, over 200 projects have been initiated, engaging over 2,000 former weapons scientists and engineers.
- ***Controlling Nuclear Exports.*** DOE has developed and is enhancing a proliferation information network to provide proliferation analysis and technical information to support the technical evaluation of export license applications. In addition, DOE has developed and begun implementing an integrated export control plan for Russia/NIS that utilizes, to the extent possible, the indigenous scientific and industrial base. Its main goal is to assist Russia/NIS in stemming the illicit flow of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use commodities, materials, and technologies.
- ***Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.*** DOE is promoting a stronger nuclear nonproliferation regime on several fronts by: supporting negotiations to stabilize spent fuel from the research reactor at Nyongbyon, North Korea; conducting technical workshops with Chinese scientists on arms control issues; increasing engagement with Middle Eastern states; engaging Indian and Pakistani scientists on regional verification issues; and providing continued support to the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementing strengthened safeguards measures.
- ***Nuclear Emergency and Terrorism Response.*** DOE maintains several emergency response assets postured to respond to events that may occur should proliferation prevention efforts fail. The emergency response asset with primary responsibility for responding to nuclear terrorism incidents is the Nuclear Emergency Search Team. The DOE also conducts threat analyses regarding nuclear terrorism as part of its nuclear emergency planning responsibilities.

U.S. Intelligence Accomplishments

- ***Intelligence Community Support for Counterproliferation.*** The CJCS's *Missions and Functions Study* (described above) evaluated and made a series of recommendations concerning Intelligence Community support for counterproliferation. Following up on these recommendations the DCI's Nonproliferation Center developed an *Action Plan* which outlines

how the Center will work with the J-2 (Intelligence) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in support of the Unified Combatant Commands, and DIA's Office of Counterproliferation, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Assessments (the J-2's Executive Agent for counterproliferation issues) developed a *Military Intelligence Action Plan*, which was approved by the CJCS.

- ***Strategic Planning Process.*** U.S. Intelligence has instituted a corporate strategic and evaluation planning process to support efforts to counter proliferation. This ongoing process contributes to the National Needs Process and the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program and Planning Guidance. A major benefit of this effort has been the placement of a significant number of DoD personnel within the DCI's Nonproliferation Center. This has helped integrate intelligence support into DoD counterproliferation needs and actions. U.S. Intelligence also has expanded its relations with law enforcement officials. The U.S. Customs Service, for example, has assigned a senior agent to the Nonproliferation Center to assist in developing joint initiatives.
- ***Operational Planning Process.*** DIA is linking counterproliferation intelligence production more directly to the CINCs' deliberate planning process. DIA is taking guidance from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and direction from the Commands' J-2s, J-3s (Operations), and J-5s (Plans and Policy) to allow U.S. Intelligence to more clearly define and satisfy the intelligence requirements needed to support CINC counterproliferation contingency planning and operations.
- ***Intelligence Successes.*** Many of U.S. Intelligence's successes cannot be described in this unclassified setting. However, some that can be described include:
 - Support to State Department efforts to provide actionable intelligence to the United Nations Special Commission inspection and monitoring efforts in Iraq;
 - Support to U.S. diplomatic discussions with South Africa concerning adherence to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty;
 - Development of a list of indicators to alert collectors and analysts that CW and BW are about to be used; similar initiatives are also under way to provide early warning alerts for the possible diversion of nuclear materials;
 - Establishment of a Southern Tier Study Group designed to focus on all WMD-related proliferation issues in the southern tier of the FSU; and
 - Support to Congressional committees, including a report that reviewed and evaluated nonproliferation programs in the National Foreign Intelligence Program FY 1996 budget submission.

Findings and Recommendations

The CPKC finds, as evidenced by the numerous accomplishments cited above and in the main body of the report, that the seriousness of the WMD proliferation threat and the need to enhance capabilities to counter it are recognized throughout the DoD, the Joint Staff (as well as the Services and CINCs), the DOE, and U.S. Intelligence. Indeed, "countering proliferation" has now become an established and institutionalized priority within each of the CPKC-represented Departments. Its visibility as a priority area has been advanced considerably by the President's declaration of a

national emergency to deal with the WMD proliferation threat. Much has been done, but much remains to do. Moreover, as the decision makers, policy makers, and warfighters continue to reprioritize their nonproliferation and counterproliferation needs, the CPRC will continue to review counterproliferation-related DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence programs to ensure that these programs continue to meet their evolving needs. The CPRC's recommendations for 1996 are summarized in Figure 1 and discussed below.

The FY 1997 President's budget, submitted to Congress in March 1996, addresses priority programs for countering proliferation. *Therefore, the CPRC recommends that the FY 1997 President's budget for each of the CPRC-represented Departments be authorized and appropriated by the Congress.*

Countering proliferation is an area that will have to be addressed for the foreseeable future. Although the programs proposed in the FY 1997 budget will continue to produce substantial progress in U.S. capabilities to address WMD proliferation, areas of capability shortfall will remain after FY 1997. *Therefore, it is the intention of the CPRC to continue the CPRC program review process beyond its congressionally mandated 1996 term.*

In light of the CPRC's finding that the need to enhance our national capabilities to counter proliferation has become established and institutionalized within the DoD, DOE, U.S. Intelligence, and the Joint Staff, the CPRC has not identified specific programmatic options this year for FY 1998. The CPRC expects the normal budget development processes of each CPRC-represented Department to be adequate to ensure a robust, integrated program for countering proliferation. *Therefore, the CPRC directs each represented Department to continue to address nonproliferation and counterproliferation needs and requirements as a high priority item in their FY 1998 budget development processes.*

To continue the record of interdepartmental achievement through an integrated response to meeting the counterproliferation ACE priorities, *the CPRC recommends a continuation of the close coordination of counterproliferation-related research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement programs and activities among the DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence.*

In order to better access and utilize and more efficiently leverage existing technical expertise in the chemical and biological sciences resident in the DOE laboratories to support enhanced technology development and rapid fielding of advanced capabilities for CW/BW defense, *the CPRC*

Recommendations of the CPRC **1996**

- **Approve the President's FY 1997 Budget for the CPRC-Represented Departments which Addresses Key Priorities in Countering Proliferation**
- **Continue the CPRC Process Beyond the Congressionally Mandated Term, and to this end:**

- **Continue to Address the Needs and Requirements for Countering Proliferation as a High Priority Item in Annual Budget Review Processes**
- **Continue Close Coordination of RDT&E and Procurement Programs Among DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence**
- **Establish a Joint DOE, DoD, and U.S. Intelligence R&D Initiative in Chemical and Biological Defense**
- **Increase International Cooperative Efforts by Expanding Existing Activities to Counter the Global WMD Proliferation Threat**
- **Review and Reprioritize the Counterproliferation ACEs to Reflect Progress and Newly Emerging Priorities**

Figure 1. CPRC Recommendations for 1996

recommends that DOE, DoD, and U.S. Intelligence establish a joint R&D initiative in CW/BW Defense. A joint long term R&D plan will be developed for CPRC review to implement this recommendation.

Recognizing the global nature of WMD proliferation threats, *the CPRC recommends increasing international cooperative efforts to counter these threats by expanding existing activities in R&D, proliferation prevention, and counterterrorism being conducted by DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence.* To expedite and more efficiently and effectively meet the challenges posed by this global problem, the CPRC further encourages and endorses cooperation with our international partners through conferences and joint programs.

In light of the ongoing reviews of CINC requirements and national counterterrorism capabilities, the CPRC will review the counterproliferation ACEs in October 1996 and reprioritize them as required based on the outcome of these reviews. Lastly, in view of the growing recognition of WMD terrorism as a significant national security threat, the CPRC believes that the current ACE priority 13, “Defend Against Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist WMD Threats”, should be elevated in priority when the ACE priority list is revised. This reprioritization will ensure that the counterproliferation ACEs continue to reflect the integration of CINC warfighting priorities and the overarching national security objectives they support. This ACE reprioritization will serve to improve the focus of future programmatic and managerial efforts to counter the threat of WMD proliferation.

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